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Using the most comprehensive, commercially-available dataset of trading activity in U.S. equity
markets, we catalog and analyze dislocation segments and realized opportunity costs (ROC) incurred
by market participants. We find that dislocation segments are common, observing a total of over 3.1
billion dislocation segments in the Russell 3000 during trading in 2016, or roughly 525 per second
of trading. Up to 23% of observed trades may have contributed the the measured inefficiencies,
leading to a ROC greater than $2 billion USD. A subset of the constituents of the S&P 500 index
experience the greatest amount of ROC and may drive inefficiencies in other stocks. In addition, we
identify fine structure and self-similarity in the intra-day distribution of dislocation segment start
times. These results point to universal underlying market mechanisms arising from the physical
structure of the U.S. National Market System.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securities markets utilize auction mechanisms to facil-
itate the valuation and trade of assets [1–4]. The op-
erational structure of these markets including the auc-
tion mechanism, physical infrastructure through which
the market is implemented, and endogenous information
asymmetries are thus intrinsic factors in their efficiency
[5, 6]. While some authors have largely neglected or min-
imized these factors in analyses of the efficiency of fi-
nancial markets [7, 8], others have recognized that these
so-called microstructure variables are central to the per-
formance of modern-day markets [9–12].
A. Modern U.S. market
We focus our investigation on equities traded in the
U.S. National Market System (NMS), a network of
privately-owned and operated stock exchanges locate in
the U.S., since it is the proverbial center of the world eq-
uity markets. In particular, we turn our attention to the
roughly 3000 largest equities traded on the NMS, com-
piled by FTSE International Ltd. as the Russell 3000 in-
dex. These securities represent the vast majority of the
securities traded in the U.S. and can serve as a nearly
comprehensive cross-section of publicly-traded securities
from which the observation and assessment of microstruc-
ture quantities can be made.
Using the most comprehensive commercially-available
dataset of NMS messages available, we enumerate and
∗ Corresponding authors: david.dewhurst@uvm.edu, btiv-
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describe dislocation segments and realized opportunity
costs, defined in Section III, in Russell 3000 securities
and a selected subset of exchange-traded funds (ETFs)
during calendar year 2016. Extending earlier work by
the present authors and others [13], we find that dislo-
cation segments and differing trades resulting in realized
opportunity cost occur frequently in the National Mar-
ket System, with over 3 × 109 dislocation segments and
a total realized opportunity cost of $2,051,916,739.66 in
2016 among securities studied. As shown in Table I, a sig-
nificant portion of all trades studied here (23.71%) were
trades for which there existed a different price elsewhere
in the NMS at which the trade did not execute. These
findings correspond with, and extend, the findings pre-
sented in [13].
B. Scaling in finance
There is widespread agreement that [14, 15] was one
of the first to characterize the scaling properties of price
returns in modern markets. The scaling of returns was
later revisited [16] and formalized and extended [17, 18].
Beyond just price fluctuations (i.e., returns in price time
series), additional financial variables have been found to
display scaling properties. For some representative ex-
amples, market indices and foreign exchange rates [19]
as well as share volume and number of trades [20] adhere
to scaling properties.
With the dramatic increase in the number of securities
under study and concomitant increase in the range of
market capitalization, we examine scaling relationships
between microstructure variables, such as dislocation seg-
ments and realized opportunity cost, and market capi-
talization and its derivative statistics. Dislocation seg-
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1 Realized Opportunity Cost $2,051,916,739.66
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $1,914,018,654.41
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $137,898,085.25
4 Trades 4,745,033,119
5 Diff. Trades 1,124,814,017
6 Traded Value $28,031,002,997,692.75
7 Diff. Traded Value $7,077,357,462,641.67
8 Percent Diff. Trades 23.71
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 25.25
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0651
TABLE I. Summary statistics of the realized opportunity cost for all studied securities that traded in 2016. Realized opportunity
cost across all equities in the year is over $2B USD. We discuss statistical characteristics of realized opportunities extensively
in Section IV. We note that ratio of the percent of differing trades to the percent of differing traded values is discussed as
a statistic of the relative value “on the table” per differing trade—a proxy for the potential profitability of latency arbitrage
strategies.
Category Duration Cond. Magnitude Cond. Count
Dow - - 120,355,462
Dow > 545µs - 65,073,196
Dow > 545µs > $0.01 2,872,734
SPexDow - - 1,126,186,592
SPexDow > 545µs - 530,499,458
SPexDow > 545µs > $0.01 51,187,430
RexSP - - 1,888,686,248
RexSP > 545µs - 704,416,718
RexSP > 545µs > $0.01 110,447,787
TABLE II. Total number of dislocation segments in mutually-exclusive market categories. Number of opportunities is calculated
unconditioned, conditioned on duration, and conditioned on both duration and magnitude.
ments occur in equities of all sizes. While they are
more frequent in equities with large market capitaliza-
tions, the distributions of their qualities, such as their
size (magnitude) and duration (how long they lasted), are
more extreme among equities with smaller market cap-
italizations. The majority of realized opportunity cost
is generated by equities in the S&P 500 that are not
also in the Dow (termed the SPexDow). The SPexDow
also Granger-causes realized opportunity costs in other
mutually-exclusive market categories (Dow 30 and Rus-
sell 3000 less the S&P 500, or RexSP), pointing to its
centrality in the U.S. equities market. When realized op-
portunity cost is analyzed at marketplace (all exchanges
and the aggregation of dark pools or alternative trading
facilities—ATFs—which is collectively known as FINRA)
granularity, the marketplaces with highest volume also
have the highest realized opportunity cost.
In the following sections, we first provide a brief overview
of the U.S. National Market System for the unfamiliar
reader. We then detail our data, the available and used
fields, and summarize the equities studied. After describ-
ing statistics of dislocation segments, including distribu-
tions of start times and durations, we move to analysis
of realized opportunity cost, providing summary statis-
tics, comparisons across exchanges, and correlation and
Granger-causality analyses. We close with a brief explo-
ration of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), a discussion of
results, and possibilities for future work.
II. MARKET OVERVIEW
We provide a brief overview of the U.S. equities market
for the unfamiliar reader; a more comprehensive sum-
mary is given in [13], along with formal set of defini-
tions that is used in this work. The U.S. equities mar-
ket, known as the National Market System (NMS), is
composed of 13 unique, privately-owned exchanges, plat-
forms on which price of equity securities are discovered by
market participants using a continuous or discrete auc-
tion mechanism. Another core component of the market
infrastructure making up the NMS are on the order of 40
privately-owned alternative trading systems (ATSs) [21],
also known as dark pools, on which market participants
can trade but usually cannot participate in price discov-
ery [22]. Each exchange and ATS keeps its own book of
orders submitted by agents; trading facilities (exchanges
and ATSs) attempt to execute orders at the “top” of
the book (the highest-priced bid orders, or orders to buy
securities, and the lowest-priced ask orders, or orders to
sell securities) along with “market” buy and sell orders—
orders that should be executed immediately, without re-
gard for execution price. The top of the book at each ex-
change is termed the best bid and offer (BBO). All BBOs
are aggregated over the entire NMS and the best bid and
offer among all BBOs is calculated and termed the na-
tional best bid and offer (NBBO). By law, trades must
execute at the NBBO, albeit with certain exceptions.[23]
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FIG. 1. Relationships between market capitalization and different dependent variables: ROC, differing trades, and total trades.
It is immediately apparent that there is a strong positive relationship between market cap and realized opportunity cost.
The data exhibits interesting nonlinearity and heteroskedasticity. Equities with smaller market capitalization have higher
variability in each dependent variable, while equities with larger Market Capitalization (MC) have generally lower variability
in each dependent variable. Also note the equities in the financial sector have a consistantly lower ROC relative to MC while
equities in the energy sector have a consistantly higher ROC relative to MC. The data are well-fit by linear and quadratic
functions in doubly-logarithmic space. Error ellipses are 95% confidence intervals for the true regression curve calculated using
bootstrapping techniques.
There are different methods by which these trading facil-
ities communicate with one another. The Securities In-
formation Processor (SIP) provides a regulation-required
communication system by which trades are reported
and price information is disseminated. There also ex-
ist privately-owned direct information feeds that provide
faster information updates than the SIP data feeds. This
differential information quality can contribute to price
discrepancies and dislocation segments that sometimes
exist between trading facilities.
The NMS is regulated by the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC), a federal government agency,
and self-regulated by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), a professional organization. FINRA
self-polices its members and attempts to ensure they ad-
here to SEC rules and other professional guidelines, while
SEC designs, implements, and enforces rules that are in-
tended to promote market stability and economic effi-
ciency.
The physical structure of the NMS, in conjunction with
the existence and usage of information feeds of differing
speeds (regulator-imposed Securities Information Proces-
sor (SIP) versus direct, proprietary feeds), leads to mar-
ket inefficiencies [24] in the form of dislocation segments
and realized opportunity costs. On Dow 30 equities, over
120 million dislocation segments and over $160M USD in
realized opportunity cost were cataloged during calendar
year 2016 [13]. These are not the first violations of the
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so-called “law of one price” that have been detected in fi-
nancial markets; multiple violations in international and
domestic financial markets have been identified for more
than a decade [25, 26]. However, our results here present
one of the more egregious violations of this “law”.
III. DATA AND METHODS
A. Data
Our data is the most comprehensive set of market data
commercially available and is effectively identical to the
SEC’s MIDAS dataset [27]. It is available for purchase
from Thesys Technologies [28] and is comprised of ev-
ery message, quote, and trade that occurred on the SIP
and of direct feeds in the NMS during the time period of
study. Information on individual companies, such as the
indexes into which companies fall, their Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS) sector, and market capi-
talization were gathered using the standard commercial
Bloomberg Terminal.
The indices we consider are subject to change daily.
In order to have consistent sets of companies to study
we consider the Dow 30 and S&P 500 as they stood on
Jan 1 2016. Additionally we consider the Russell 3000
2016 (i.e., the Russell 3000 constructed in June 2016)
excluding components that were not publicly traded on
a major exchange on Jan 1 2016.
Each index under study was curated to only include
companies that survived as an individual, publicly traded
entity on a major exchange for the entire calendar year
of 2016. In other words, companies that were delisted
from NYSE or NASDAQ for any reason (e.g. Chapter 11
bankruptcy or buyout) were removed. Companies that
merged with another member of our dataset remained
under study while those who merged with a firm outside
of our dataset were removed from consideration. This
curation process allows us to avoid several edge cases of
market behavior including IPOs and de listings.
Many companies in our dataset changed their ticker sym-
bol over the course of the calendar year and thus appear
as a different entity in the data. To study a company
over a long time period it is necessary to know all tickers
it traded under and when the ticker changes occurred.
As there is an absence of a consolidated public record
of these symbol changes, we tracked them through an
extensive manual review of press releases. These sym-
bol changes were then validated by comparison with the
Thesys data feed. Specifically, we confirmed that on the
date of the change, trading activity ceased on the old
ticker and began on the new symbol.
This curation reduced the Russell 3000 from 3005 com-
panies to 2903 and the S&P 500 from 500 companies to
472. No companies were removed from the Dow 30 set.
Note that the mutually exclusive indices are constructed
using the curated sets and the curated sets are designated
by appending a prime to the respective base index (e.g.
Dow 30→ Dow 30′). Finally all companies in our dataset
were classified by their market capitalization as it stood
in the beginning of Q4 2016. There is no industry stan-
dard on either the range of market caps that define a class
or the number of classes. Furthermore these definitions
change over time as companies reach larger market caps
with the overall growth of the economy. Our definitions
for these classes are displayed in Table IV [29].
Our work here focuses on dislocations (and their con-
stituent dislocation segments) and the related realized
opportunity costs arising from price discrepancies be-
tween the SIP and direct feeds. Both concepts have been
discussed throughout the empirical market microstruc-
ture literature [30–33], though definitions of these quan-
tities are not entirely settled, we will abide by those set
in [13]. We briefly review these definitions and detail
the calculation of dislocations, dislocation segments, and
realized opportunity cost from our data.
Suppose that there exist two sources of information I1
and I2 on market data displaying respective prices for
an asset p1(t) and p2(t) observed from a single, well-
defined location. We will term a dislocation between
these sources of data as the amount of time during which
the price information given by the information feeds dif-
fers. A related but distinct concept is that of a disloca-
tion segment, defined as an amount of time during which
the price information given by the information feeds dif-
fers in a single direction (i.e., we must have ∆p > 0 or
∆p < 0 during the entire time of the dislocation seg-
ment). The realized opportunity cost of using I1 instead
of I2 over an amount of time [0, T ] is calculated as fol-
lows: for every trade that occurs during [0, T ], the dif-
ference in execution price |p1−p2| is calculated and mul-
tiplied by the number of shares in the trade n. The total
realized opportunity cost over the interval [0, T ] is then
given by the sum over the realized opportunity cost as-
sociated with each trade in [0, T ].
Equities contained in our dataset represent approxi-
mately 98% of all publicly-traded equities in the U.S. by
market capitalization [34]. Tables III - V provide sum-
mary statistics and distribution of these equities across
business sector, market cap, and market category, for
several indices.
B. Methods
We first compute basic summary statistics and quali-
tative descriptions of the distributions of dislocation seg-
ments and realized opportunity costs. In addition to
computing summary statistics, the larger sample of equi-
ties (all equities traded on the National Market System
during 2016) allows us to conduct a cross-sectional study
of the effect of company “size” on these microstructure
quantities. We quantify the notion of size of a company
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Sector Statistic Russ 3K′ S&P 500′ Dow 30′ RexSP SPexDow
Consumer
Discretionary
% by # 14.92 16.95 13.33 14.52 17.19
% by MC 12.97 11.92 8.98 16.40 13.10
Count 433 80 4 353 76
($) MC Min 95,330,024 1,244,719,232 84,654,022,656 95,330,024 1,244,719,232
($) MC Max 356,313,137,152 356,313,137,152 165,862,064,128 89,539,158,016 356,313,137,152
Consumer
Staples
% by # 4.03 7.20 10 3.41 7.01
% by MC 8.54 9.99 10.74 3.83 9.69
Count 117 34 3 83 31
($) MC Min 114,570,432 9,794,159,616 178,815,287,296 114,570,432 9,794,159,616
($) MC Max 224,997,457,920 224,997,457,920 224,997,457,920 17,508,790,272 150,058,582,016
Energy
% by # 5.20 7.63 6.67 4.73 7.69
% by MC 6.57 7.14 10.40 4.71 5.83
Count 151 36 2 115 34
($) MC Min 160,502,160 2,427,903,232 222,190,436,352 160,502,160 2,427,903,232
($) MC Max 374,280,552,448 374,280,552,448 374,280,552,448 27,468,929,024 116,800,331,776
Financials
% by # 17.81 12.50 13.33 18.84 12.44
% by MC 15.17 13.07 8.91 21.99 14.73
Count 517 59 4 458 55
($) MC Min 89,903,488 3,021,111,552 34,774,474,752 89,903,488 3,021,111,552
($) MC Max 401,644,421,120 308,768,440,320 308,768,440,320 401,644,421,120 276,779,139,072
Health
Care
% by # 15.23 12.08 13.33 15.84 11.99
% by MC 12.49 13.53 14.38 9.12 13.19
Count 442 57 4 385 53
($) MC Min 21,050,850 1,478,593,408 152,328,667,136 21,050,850 1,478,593,408
($) MC Max 313,432,473,600 313,432,473,600 313,432,473,600 18,889,377,792 108,768,911,360
Industrials
% by # 13.47 13.77 16.67 13.41 13.57
% by MC 10.40 10.20 10.94 11.03 9.91
Count 391 65 5 326 60
($) MC Min 58,695,636 2,821,674,240 54,259,630,080 58,695,636 2,821,674,240
($) MC Max 279,545,937,920 279,545,937,920 279,545,937,920 13,281,452,032 100,041,220,096
Information
Technology
% by # 14.40 13.35 20 14.60 12.90
% by MC 21.40 23.74 30.74 13.81 20.93
Count 418 63 6 355 57
($) MC Min 114,370,240 3,334,570,240 151,697,113,088 114,370,240 3,334,570,240
($) MC Max 617,588,457,472 617,588,457,472 617,588,457,472 32,402,583,552 538,572,161,024
Materials
% by # 4.55 5.30 3.33 4.40 5.43
% by MC 3.26 2.47 1.11 5.83 3.02
Count 132 25 1 107 24
($) MC Min 103,733,456 2,823,849,728 63,809,703,936 103,733,456 2,823,849,728
($) MC Max 69,704,540,160 63,809,703,936 63,809,703,936 69,704,540,160 46,132,944,896
Real
Estate
% by # 6.61 4.66 0.00 6.99 4.98
% by MC 3.89 2.41 0.00 8.67 3.38
Count 192 22 0 170 22
($) MC Min 161,591,616 7,130,559,488 0.00 161,591,616 7,130,559,488
($) MC Max 55,830,577,152 55,830,577,152 0.00 24,264,243,200 55,830,577,152
Telecommunication
Services
% by # 1.03 1.06 3.33 1.03 0.90
% by MC 2.40 2.57 3.79 1.82 2.09
Count 30 5 1 25 4
($) MC Min 285,299,072 3,964,831,488 217,610,731,520 285,299,072 3,964,831,488
($) MC Max 261,176,721,408 261,176,721,408 217,610,731,520 47,389,126,656 261,176,721,408
Utilities
% by # 2.76 5.51 0.00 2.22 5.88
% by MC 2.91 2.95 0.00 2.78 4.13
Count 80 26 0 54 26
($) MC Min 141,720,064 3,867,331,328 0.00 141,720,064 3,867,331,328
($) MC Max 57,253,351,424 57,253,351,424 0.00 12,880,323,584 57,253,351,424
TABLE III. Market Capitalization (MC) statistics of equities under study broken out by Global Industry Classification
Standard (GICS) sector. The composition of various indexes is displayed by the percentage of index constituents that are a
member of each given sector (% by #) and by the weighting of those constituents (% by MC). Additionally the MC of the
smallest and largest constituent for each index in each category is displayed.
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Class Stat Russ 3K′ S&P 500′ Dow 30′ RexSP SPexDow
Nano
MC ≤ $50M
% by # 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00
% by MC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Count 4 0 0 4 0
Micro
$50M < MC ≤ $300M
% by # 11.51 0.00 0.00 13.74 0.00
% by MC 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.09 0.00
Count 334 0 0 334 0
Small
$300M < MC ≤ $2B
% by # 42.89 0.42 0.00 51.13 0.45
% by MC 4.37 0.01 0.00 18.50 0.02
Count 1,245 2 0 1,243 2
Mid
$2B < MC ≤ $10B
% by # 30.35 20.76 0.00 32.21 22.17
% by MC 15.11 3.37 0.00 53.19 4.72
Count 881 98 0 783 98
Large
$10B < MC ≤ $200B
% by # 14.50 75.21 66.67 2.71 75.79
% by MC 56.68 67.77 43.28 20.72 77.59
Count 421 355 20 66 335
Mega
MC > $200B
% by # 0.62 3.60 33.33 0.04 1.58
% by MC 23.58 28.85 56.72 6.50 17.67
Count 18 17 10 1 7
TABLE IV. Composition of indexes under study by market capitalization (MC) classification. The composition of various
indexes is displayed by the percentage of index constituents that are a member of each given index (% by #) and by the
weighting of those constituents (% by MC).
Russ 3K′ S&P 500′ Dow 30′ RexSP SPexDow
Count 2,903 472 30 2,431 442
($) MC Sum 26,217,754,755,404 20,040,462,107,136 5,736,789,102,592 6,177,292,648,268 14,303,673,004,544
($) MC Min 21,050,850 1,244,719,232 34,774,474,752 21,050,850 1,244,719,232
($) MC Max 617,588,457,472 617,588,457,472 617,588,457,472 401,644,421,120 538,572,161,024
TABLE V. Makeup of market indexes by number of constituents. Additionally the Market Capitalization (MC) of the smallest
and largest constituent for each indexed is displayed along with sum of all constituent MCs.
by both its market capitalization and its rank in relation
to other companies. In addition, we create disjoint sets
of equities and compute aggregate statistics across these
sets. Since the S&P 500 is a strict superset of the Dow 30
and the Russell 3000 is a strict superset of the S&P 500,
the natural division of the superset of all equities under
study is into three distinct classes: the Dow 30, the S&P
500 excluding the Dow 30 (SPexDOW), and the Russell
3000 excluding the S&P 500 (RexSP). We compute mea-
sures of correlation between these disjoint subsets, and
characterize the statistical properties of the time series of
dislocation segments and realized opportunity cost across
these disjoint categories. We further explore the relation-
ship between these categories by conducting a Granger
causality analysis of aggregated realized opportunity cost
time series [35].
We also analyze the distribution of microstructure quan-
tities across exchanges. Since different exchanges may
have substantially different hardware (such as fiber-optic
cables and computers) and software (such as matching
engines), it is possible that dislocation segment and re-
alized opportunity cost distributions vary significantly
across exchanges; examples of the hardware and software
used in exchanges vary in type and complexity [36–39].
We compute summary statistics and provide qualitative
comparisons of the results.
The next section gives results on dislocation segments,
including summary statistics overall and across mutually-
exclusive market category, and regressions of dislocation
segments against market cap. We then discuss struc-
ture in the intra-day distribution of dislocation segment
start times and dislocation segment duration. Following
this, we provide statistics of the realized opportunity cost
across the market as a whole and again within mutually-
exclusive market categories. We then explore statistical
properties of the ROC time series and conduct a Granger-
causality analysis of ROC by mutually-exclusive market
category. We close with an overview of the statistics of
ETF dislocation segments and realized opportunity costs,
contrasting these with those of the market as a whole.
IV. RESULTS
A. Dislocation Segments
Dislocation segments can occur when prices propa-
gated by distinct information feeds differ. We cataloged
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all dislocation segments occurring in the equities stud-
ied here and present summary statistics and qualitative
comparisons of their distributions and higher-order mo-
ment statistics. Tables VIII - XVI display means of sum-
mary statistics of dislocation segments for each mutually-
exclusive subset of the equities under study. We will use
the notation 〈fA〉 to denote an average of the quantity
f conditioned on the condition A. These averages are
interpreted as the quantity f conditioned on condition A
averaged over all securities and all times of observation;
defining the number of instances of the quantity f having
condition A as NA, we have
〈fA〉 = 1
NA
∑
1≤n≤NA
f has condition A
fn. (1)
On average, there were more dislocation segments in Dow
30 securities (〈Nuncond〉 ' 4×106, 〈Nduration〉 ' 2×106,
〈Nduration, magnitude〉 ' 9 × 104) than in SPex-
Dow (〈Nuncond〉 ' 2 × 106, 〈Nduration〉 ' 1 × 106,
〈Nduration, magnitude〉 ' 1 × 105) or RexSP
(〈Nuncond〉 ' 7 × 105, 〈Nduration〉 ' 2 × 105,
〈Nduration, magnitude〉 ' 4 × 104) securities. How-
ever, the average maximum magnitude of latency
arbitrage opportunities in the Dow30 in each condition-
ing class (unconditioned, conditioned only on duration,
and conditioned on both duration and magnitude)
is lower than those of the SPexDow, which in turn
are lower than those of the RexSP. In particular,
actionable dislocation segments (those with duration
> 545µs) with magnitude > $0.01 exhibit more extreme
behavior in the SPexDow and RexSP than in the
Dow. On average, the median maximum magnitude
in the Dow 30 among actionable dislocation seg-
ments was
〈
median max magduration,magnitude
〉 '
$0.023, while in the SPexDow we observed〈
median max magduration,magnitude
〉 ' $0.034 and in the
RexSP
〈
median max magduration,magnitude
〉 ' $0.045,
a roughly one-cent increase in the median maximum
magnitude of a dislocation segment in each mutually-
exclusive category. Examples of distributions of these
quantities are given in Figure 2, where the distribu-
tions of the means of minimum magnitude, maximum
magnitude, and duration are plotted for the RexSP.
Taken as a whole, these results provide evidence for the
existence of a market capitalization scaling effect in dislo-
cation segments: larger securities are on average traded
more and hence have a higher average number of dis-
location segments, but exhibit on average less extreme
behavior in moment and quantile statistics of these op-
portunities; more frequent trading implies a lower prob-
ability that prices across differing information feeds will
diverge by large magnitudes.
Since dislocation segments are not distributed evenly
throughout the day in the Dow 30 [13], we examine their
distribution in the SPexDow and the RexSP as well. Ap-
pendix B contains figures displaying the distribution of
latency arbitrage opportunity start times plotted modulo
day and aggregated over the year and figures displaying
the distribution of dislocation segment durations for each
mutually exclusive market category. Distributions are
plotted both without conditioning and when conditioned
on duration or magnitude (or both).
Distributions of start times display predictable structure.
In all market categories, there are large peaks at the very
beginning and end of the trading day (circa 9:30 AM and
4:00 PM), along with a noticeable and sudden increase in
density around 2:00 PM. The peak in density that occurs
at the end of the day is most noticeable when the distri-
bution of start times is not conditioned on dislocation
segment size; when the distribution is conditioned, this
peak is present but the density is much lower. These ob-
servations correspond with the results found for the Dow
30 in [13]. However, along with these granular observa-
tions, there also exists structure on shorter timescales.
The distribution exhibits self-similarity on the half-hour
timescale, with large peaks every half-hour and decreas-
ing density toward a sudden peak at the next half-hour.
There is also structure at the five-minute timescale that
is noticeable before the 2:00 PM spike in density but does
not appear to be present after the spike. (Future work
could statistically test for the presence of this structure
and for its persistence across multiple timescales.) The
structure on shorter timescales is present in all distribu-
tions but, again, is more pronounced in distributions not
conditioned on magnitude.
Distributions of dislocation segment duration also exhibit
definite structure, though it is realized in a different way.
These distributions are plotted log-transformed, as they
are leptokurtic. All distributions exhibit one or more
peaks in the range 10−4s ≤ log10 duration ≤ 10−3s, but
there is also a distinct and much lower peak in the dis-
tribution near approximately one second in length.
As a visual aid to these results, we have included cir-
cle plots, as introduced in [13], to demonstrate the
non-uniform distribution of dislocation segments in both
time- and event-space that can occur. We construct
these circle graphs for the equities with the smallest mar-
ket cap in our sample (GALE), highest market cap in
our sample (AAPL), and the highest-volume S&P 500
ETF (SPY) for comparison. Figure 3 displays circle
graphs for the above-mentioned tickers for an arbitrary
day (2016-01-07), while Figure 4 displays circle graphs
for the same tickers but aggregated over a year (modulo
day). There is substantial variation between the circle
graphs of these tickers. AAPL displays intricate struc-
ture in event space, while GALE display similar structure
but with much lower density, as it has far fewer disloca-
tion segments. In time-space, AAPL and GALE display
similar nonuniform density of events, with both exhibit-
ing notable peaks near the beginning of the trading day.
AAPL also exhibits large spikes in density near 12:30 PM
and 2:30 PM. In contrast, SPY displays time-space event
density that is far more uniform than either AAPL or
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FIG. 2. Histograms of the base-10 logarithm of minimum magnitude, maximum magnitude, and duration of dislocation segments
in the RexSP without conditioning on duration or magnitude. The distributions are leptokurtic, with the log-distributions of
minimum and maximum magnitude presenting a long right tail and the distribution of log-duration displaying a rough bell-
shape.
GALE. Visualizations of many securities in this format
can be found at the authors’ webpage [40].
B. Market capitalization
Further evidence for scaling behavior arises from anal-
ysis of market capitalization. Tables III and V display
market capitalization statistics broken down by indus-
try sector and categorical size, e.g., micro-cap, mega-cap,
etc. Market capitalization is significantly positively cor-
related with realized opportunity cost. Tables XXXII
- XXXV display results from ordinary least squares re-
gressions predicting realized opportunity cost using pre-
dictors including market capitalization. A linear fit pre-
dicting log10 ROC from log10 market capitalization, log10
total trades, and log10 differing trades gives R
2 ' 0.908,
with a positive coefficient relating log10 ROC to log10
market capitalization; higher market capitalization is as-
sociated with higher ROC. A similar regression is com-
puted including quadratic terms in log10 market capital-
ization, which has a significant, but weak, negative asso-
ciation with ROC. Similar relationships hold for both the
linear and quadratic models when the dependent variable
is instead chosen to be total or differing trades.
Though behavior of ROC as a function of market capital-
ization is generally similar when equities are stratified by
sector, some sectors display lower average levels of ROC,
differing trades, or total trades when market capitaliza-
tion is held constant. Equities classified as being in the
financial sector generally have a smaller amount of ROC,
while equities classified as being in the energy sector ex-
hibit a higher amount of ROC on average. However,
there is no clear general trend linking sectors to market
capitalization or to ROC.
C. Realized opportunity cost
As expected with an increase in the number of ana-
lyzed equities from 30 to more than 2900, the amount
of realized opportunity cost rose substantially from the
quantity reported in an earlier study by the present au-
thors and others, from $160M to $2.05B USD. Realized
opportunity cost (ROC) clearly displays sublinear scal-
ing with number of studied equities; we do not observe a
thousandfold increase in the amount of ROC with a thou-
sandfold increase in the number of equities. The infor-
mation advantage afforded traders with access to direct
feed information is not uniform; though a vast majority
of the ROC ($1.91 B) favored the direct feeds in this way,
a non-negligible amount of ROC ($137 M) did favor the
SIP feeds. Of all trades observed (trades that occurred at
the SIP BBO), approximately a quarter (23.71%) of all
trades were classified as differing trades, or trades that
occurred at a time during which there existed a differ-
ent price at which the trade could have executed. The
fraction of “differing traded value”—the nominal market
value of all differing trades—was slightly higher (25.25%)
than the fraction of all trades that were differing trades.
The fractional part of the ratio of these fractions (1.0651)
can be interpreted as a rough estimate of a rate of prof-
itability of latency arbitrage trading strategies.
SPexDow securities account for a plurality of all trades
under study that resulted in realized opportunity cost,
with the median number of differing trades per day that
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FIG. 3. Circle graphs constructed using the dislocation segments that occurred between 9:30am and 4:00pm on 2016-01-07.
From top to bottom, where the left column is event-space and right column is time-space: AAPL, the equity with the highest
market capitalization; GALE, the equity with the lowest market capitalization in our study; and SPY, the ETF that tracks
the S&P 500.
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FIG. 4. Circle graphs constructed using the dislocation segments that occurred between 9:30am on 2016-01-01 and 4:00pm on
2016-12-31. From top to bottom, where the left column is event-space and right column is time-space: AAPL, the equity with
the highest market capitalization; GALE, the equity with the lowest market capitalization in our study; and SPY, the ETF
that tracks the S&P 500.
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occurred in the SPexDow calculated to be 2,006,091, in
contrast to the 309,158 in the Dow 30 or 1,921,121 in
the RexSP. The median differing traded value per day
in the SPexDow was also the highest among the three
categories, totaling approximately $14.07T versus the
ReXSP’s total of $6.7T and the Dow’s total of $3.27T.
Realized opportunity cost per share differed across the
three categories, with median ROC per share per day
on the Dow calculated to be $0.011, on the SPexDow
to be $0.015, and on the RexSP to be $0.021. This re-
sult is not surprising, as this particular measure of “mar-
ket inefficiency” (ROC per share) increases with the de-
crease in average size of equity, with lowest ROC per
share occurring in the Dow and highest ROC per share
occurring in the set of equities ranked 501 and above.
Median total ROC per day on the Dow amounted to
$514.8K, while median total ROC per day on the SPex-
Dow totaled $3.384M and on the RexSP amounted to
$3.564M. Summary statistics for distributions of ROC
for each mutually-exclusive category are given in Tables
XXV, XXIV and XXVI.
It is interesting to consider the distribution of both total
ROC and ROC per share by both equity and mutually-
exclusive category. Figure 6 displays ROC of the top 30
and bottom 30 of all securities under study when ranked
by ROC. Included in this figure for comparison is the
exchange-traded fund SPY, an ETF that tracks the S&P
500. (Selected ETFs are also treated separately in Sec-
tion IV D.) It is notable that the equity with the largest
ROC, Bank of America (BAC), has more than twice the
ROC of the equity with the second-largest amount of
ROC, Verizon (VZ). Though not an equity and not in-
cluded in the rest of this study, it is also notable that
SPY, one of the most heavily traded securities on the
NMS along with BAC, is close to BAC in amount of ROC.
Of the top 30 securities with most ROC, eight of the 30
are Dow 30 equities; only four out of 30 are RexSP equi-
ties, while the other 17 non-ETF securities are SPexDow
equities. Since the S&P 500 appears to be the primary
driver of ROC across all equities (c.f. below), we find
the top 30 and bottom 30 S&P 500 securities ranked by
ROC, including Dow 30 securities, and plot their ROC
in Figure 7. Even in this subset, only 10 of the top 30
equities are Dow 30 securities. However, when the unit of
analysis changes to ROC per share, as in Figure 8, we find
that RexSP equities fill 27 out of 30 top ranks, which cor-
responds with the aggregated statistics reported in Table
XXVI when compared with Tables XXIV and XXV.
Since there appear to be differences between the (station-
ary) summary statistics of the mutually-exclusive mar-
ket categories, it is reasonable that there may be signifi-
cant differences between the ROC statistics considered as
time-dependent stochastic processes and simply consid-
ered as random variables decoupled from time. Within
each category, the ROC was computed for all equities
in that category for each day. Each ROC series is then
normalized as ri 7→ ri−〈ri〉√
Var(ri)
, which allows direct compar-
ison of the series. Figure 16 displays a quantile-quantile
plot of the Dow, SPexDow, and RexSP ROC distribu-
tions. The Dow distribution is plotted as linear and the
other two distributions are compared with it. It is im-
mediately obvious that the left tails of the SPexDow and
RexSP distributions are heavier than that of the Dow;
this also appears to be the case for the right tails of the
distributions, but there is little sampling in this region
and so no conclusion can be drawn. This similarity of the
SPexDow and RexSP distributions is also striking; when
normalized they appear almost identical.
Figure 17 displays the time-dependent sample paths
of ROC sampled at daily resolution. These processes
are anti-autocorrelated—they display mean reversion—
as evidenced by their detrended fluctuation analysis
(DFA) [41] exponents of αDow = 0.438, αSPexDow =
0.242, and αRexSP = 0.235. All series exhibit rare large
values from time to time, with the Dow ROC series ex-
hibiting the largest rare values relative to its mean fluc-
tuations and the SPexDow series exhibiting the smallest.
We also note that, in accordance with the QQ plot of the
time-decoupled distributions above, the DFA exponents
of the SPexDow and RexSP—and thus their correspond-
ing dynamical behavior—are closer than they are to the
Dow DFA exponent.
A review of the above results points to the SPexDow
as being the “dominant” mutually-exclusive category in
some sense: it accounts for a plurality of differing trades,
differing traded value, and total ROC, while also having
a DFA exponent lower than that of the Dow and close
in value to that of the RexSP, meaning that its time-
series of ROC is strongly mean-reverting. The amalga-
mation of these facts can be interpreted as evidence that
the SPexDow ROC time series is possibly least likely to
be influenced by the other series of ROC. To test this
hypothesis, we conduct a number of Granger causality
tests on the time series of ROC. Granger causality is
the notion that, beyond mere correlation in time series,
past values of one time series may be useful in predict-
ing current and future values of another time series [35].
A maximum lag of 40 days was set and four tests were
calculated pairwise between each of the three mutually-
exclusive categories: sum of squared residuals χ2-test,
a likelihood ratio test, sum of squared residuals F -test,
and a Wald test. We consider there to be a significant
Granger causality between series when all four tests indi-
cate significant Granger causality at the p = 0.05/Nlags
confidence level. The correction for multiple comparisons
is done using the most conservative estimate, the Bon-
ferroni correction, to minimize the probability of Type
I error [42]. Figure 5 displays the results of these tests
graphically as a directed network. The direction of edges
denotes the direction of the Granger-causal relationship
between the categories, while the weights on the edges de-
note the total number of lags for which the relationship
was significant. The SPexDow is shown to significantly
influence both the Dow and RexSP while not being signif-
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icantly influenced by either category; this provides strong
evidence to support our above hypothesis. We note that
the SPY tracks the S&P 500, is one of the most heavily-
traded securities, and has the second-highest amount of
ROC of the securities under study here. The SPY’s price
dynamics and ROC may thus have a material effect on
the relationships between the S&P 500’s ROC and those
of the other market categories, providing a partial con-
founding effect to the Granger-causal relationship deter-
mined here; there may be a mutually-causal relationship
between the real S&P 500 and the ETF that tracks it.
The RexSP and Dow have a mutually Granger-causal re-
lationship, with the Dow exerting more influence on the
RexSP than the other way around. This finding corre-
sponds with the ranking of categories on a total shares
traded per number of equities basis; this is not a surpris-
ing result. We also find that the SPexDow exerts far less
influence on the RexSP than does the Dow (four total
lags for the SPexDow versus 23 total lags for the Dow),
a fact for which we do not have a ready explanation.
Dow
SPexDowRexSP
23
4
4
24
FIG. 5. Network of relationships between mutually-exclusive
market categories implied by results of four Granger causal-
ity tests. The direction of the edges gives the direction of the
Granger-causal relationship, while the weight on the edge is
the total number of lags for which the relationship was signif-
icant at the p = 0.05/Nlags level (the conservative Bonferroni
correction). The maximum number of lags was chosen to be
Nlags = 40. Thickness of the edge is proportional to edge
weight and is plotted for emphasis in visualization.
Providing further evidence for the above hypothesis, we
compute Pearson correlations between pairs of mutually
exclusive categories for both ROC and ROC per share;
these results are displayed in Table VI. ROC correlations
are strongest between SPexDow and RexSP (ρ = 0.72)
and SPexDow and Dow (ρ = 0.45), while the correlation
between the RexSP and Dow is lower (ρ = 0.31). ROC
per share correlations are universally lower than those for
ROC, but the correlations between SPexDow and RexSP
(ρ = 0.41) and SPexDow and Dow (ρ = 0.10) are still
higher than that between RexSP and Dow (ρ = −0.01),
which is actually negative.
Finally, we break ROC out by both exchange and (not
mutually-exclusive) market category. Figures 9, 10, and
11 display the distributions of total ROC per day in
2016 by exchange; the vertical axis is transformed as
x 7→ log10(|x| + 1) for ease of viewing. (We choose this
transformation for its usefulness in the case where data
has both a large range and many values near zero. Since
log(|x| + 1) = ∑∞n=1(−1)n+1 |x|nn for |x| < 1, near zero
we have log(|x| + 1) ' |x|, while at large values of |x| it
is essentially indistinguishable from log |x|.) In all three
categories, the exchanges with the most total ROC are
NYSE and NASDAQ, followed by ARCA, BATS, and
EDGX. Consistent with all summary statistics reported
in previous work, CHX and NSX have by far the least
ROC across all three categories [13]. Turning our analy-
sis to ROC per share by exchange, Figures 12, 13, and 14
display daily ROC per share by exchange. The left panel
of each figure shows the entire distribution, while the
right panel displays the distribution truncated to within
the 99th and 1st percentiles. The non-truncated distribu-
tions are almost-comically heavy-tailed—the excess kur-
tosis (kurtosis minus 3) of the EDGX - Russell distribu-
tion is κ ' 55, 652—hence the truncation for the pur-
poses of analysis; it seems likely that the kurtosis of the
theoretical distributions do not exist, implying tail expo-
nent γ < 4 in the distribution Pr(X > x) ∼ x−(γ−1).
(Table XXVII displays the kurtosis and skew for each
non-truncated distribution.) The means of the truncated
distributions are significantly above one cent per share fa-
voring the direct feeds (i.e., significantly below −$0.01)
in all distributions. Among Dow 30 equities, CHX and
NYSE have exceptionally long tails favoring the direct
feeds. In the case of S&P 500 tickers, FINRA (alterna-
tive trading facilities / dark pools) have a distribution
significantly more toward the direct feed than any ex-
change; its mean ROC per share is above $0.20, while
when considering the entire superset of all equities in the
Russell 3000 NYSE, AMEX and FINRA are all leptokur-
tic favoring the direct feeds.
D. ETFs
Exchange traded funds (ETFs) are securities that
trade on the NMS and are designed to mimic as closely as
possible a particular portfolio of other securities. They
are thus governed by the same price discovery mechanism
as other securities that trade on the NMS, as opposed to
the end-of-day price discovery mechanism to which mu-
tual funds are subjected, but also allow investors to own
a portion of potentially many underlying assets (or at
least a simulacrum of such), similar to a mutual fund.
Here, we briefly remark on the similarities and differences
between ETFs designed to track subsets of the market
and those subsets of the market themselves. We calcu-
lated statistics on the dislocation segments and realized
opportunity cost attributed to ten ETFs, the descrip-
tions of which are given in Table VII. We concentrate on
measures of whole-market activity, with three ETFs that
track the S&P 500 and Russell 3000 respectively. To iso-
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ROC
Dow SPexDow RexSP
Dow 1.000000 0.451072 0.319018
SPexDow 0.451072 1.000000 0.724903
RexSP 0.319018 0.724903 1.000000
ROC / Share
Dow SPexDow RexSP
Dow 1.000000 0.103061 -0.019662
SPexDow 0.103067 1.000000 0.411443
RexSP -0.019662 0.411443 1.000000
TABLE VI. Pearson correlation matrices of mutually-exclusive index subsets. For each index subset a daily resolution time
series is constructed for the given statistic over all stocks in the index subset. For the ROC series the ROC generated for
each stock on a particular trading day is summed, while in the ROC per share case the values are averaged. The correlation
coefficients are then calculated between pairs of time series in order to construct the tables above. The left table displays ROC
correlations, while the right table displays ROC per share correlations. The ROC per share statistic normalizes the number of
traded shares, allowing for a fair comparison between the more heavily traded stocks in the Dow 30 or S&P 500 subset with
the more lightly traded stocks in the Russell 3000 subset.
late dynamics among ETFs that track smaller equities,
we also include three ETFs that track the Russell 2000,
the smallest 2000 equities by market cap in the Russell
3000.
Table XXVIII summarizes ROC statistics for the ETFs
under study. The fraction of differing trades and differ-
ing traded value are lower than for any of the indexes
as a whole; in fact, the ratio of the fraction of differing
traded value to the fraction of differing trades is less than
one. Total realized opportunity cost incurred from trades
in ETFs studied here totaled over $38 million in calen-
dar year 2016. This statistic provides some evidence to
suggest that ETFs have their own endogenous statistical
behavior that differs from the behavior of the assets from
which they are derived.
ETF Description
SPY SPDR S&P 500 ETF, one of the most
heavily traded securities on the NMS (c.f.
above)
VOO Vanguard S&P 500 ETF
IVV iShares S&P 500 ETF
THRK SPDR Russell 3000 ETF
VTHR Vanguard Russell 3000 ETF
IWV iShares Russell 3000 ETF
TWOK SPDR Russell 2000 ETF
VTWO Vanguard Russell 2000 ETF
IWN iShares Russell 2000 ETF
TABLE VII. Descriptions of the ETFs studied.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, we have demonstrated that the existence of
dislocation segments and realized opportunity cost is not
restricted to Dow 30 securities. Furthermore, we have es-
tablished that these microstructure quantities occur with
non-negligible frequency and size; we show that total re-
alized opportunity cost in Russell 3000 securities was well
in excess of $2 billion USD during 2016. Compounding
these results, we provide strong statistical evidence that
the S&P 500 excluding Dow 30 securities, to which we
refer as the SPexDow, is the primary driver of realized
opportunity cost among the three mutually exclusive cat-
egories of equities (Dow 30, SPexDow, and Russell 3000
excluding S&P 500 securities, or the RexSP).
Compounding the above results, we find that structure in
the distributions of dislocation segment start times and
duration persist across the entire Russell 3000, indicat-
ing some broader microstructure-based proximate cause
of this structure. Distributions of latency arbitrage dura-
tion exhibit a large peak between 10−4 and 10−3 seconds
(100 microseconds to one millisecond), but also exhibit a
second smaller, yet distinct, peak near one second. This
separation of timescales in the distribution provide evi-
dence for the existence of at least two distinct proximate
causes of latency arbitrage opportunities. Distributions
of dislocation segment start times display even more in-
tricate structure, with large peaks at the beginning and
end of the trading day, self-similarity on the half-hour
and ten-minute timescales, and a large spike at 2:00 PM.
Realized opportunity cost was highest among SPexDow
securities, but realized opportunity cost per share was
highest among RexSP securities, which were also the
most lightly-traded securities. All time series of realized
opportunity cost exhibit behavior of anti-autocorrelation,
meaning that they are mean-reverting. Realized oppor-
tunity costs in the SPexDow Granger-cause realized op-
portunity costs in the other market categories, but the
converse is not true; while the Dow Granger-causes the
RexSP, the RexSP only weakly Granger-causes the Dow
and does not have any effect on the SPexDow. When
considering realized opportunity cost by exchange (in-
cluding the aggregation of all alternative trading facili-
ties, denoted as FINRA), the largest exchanges by mar-
ket volume (NYSE, INET, ARCA, BATS, and EDGX)
capture a large majority of the realized opportunity cost.
However, passing to analysis of realized opportunity cost
per share, NYSE, CHX, and FINRA are clear outliers
in the Dow, S&P. and Russell; AMEX is a clear outlier
when considering the Russell superset.
Taken together, these results paint the picture of a NMS
the physical structure of which generates effects that are
persistent across size of equity and exchange. Amplifying
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these persistent effects is the apparent central role of the
SPexDow; in number of dislocation segments, amount of
realized opportunity cost, spectral properties of realized
opportunity cost time series, and Granger-causal rela-
tionships, the story emerges of the SPexDow’s character-
istics being generated by largely-endogenous factors and
subsequently influencing the characteristics of the Dow
and RexSP. Future work could explore in more depth
the extent to which microstructure effects arising first
in the SPexDow then spread to other mutually exclu-
sive market categories and propagate through time. This
work could also explore the evolutionary dynamics of the
modern NMS from its birth following the financial crisis
of 2007/8 to the present day. The NMS may not have re-
mained static, with a constant number of market centers
and a stationary distribution of market agents and trad-
ing strategies, but rather may have experienced fluctua-
tions in the number of exchanges, in the regulatory envi-
ronment, and in strategy profiles of trading agents. Such
an analysis could pave the way for more well-informed
modelling efforts and development of financial economic
theory.
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Appendix A: Tables
1. Dislocation Segments
2. Realized opportunity cost
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min. magnitude ($) max. magnitude ($) duration (s)
count 4,011,848.7333 4,011,848.7333 4,011,848.7333
mean 0.0110 0.0136 0.0754
std 0.0391 0.2725 5.8295
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.0000
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.0002
50% 0.0100 0.0100 0.0007
75% 0.0100 0.0103 0.0013
max 44.6933 279.2057 8,408.9315
TABLE VIII. Mean of summary statistics for the Dow 30 without conditioning on duration or magnitude.
min. magnitude ($) max. magnitude ($) duration (s)
count 2,169,106.5333 2,169,106.5333 2,169,106.5333
mean 0.0108 0.0149 0.1328
std 0.0436 0.3548 7.6454
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.0005
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.0008
50% 0.0100 0.0100 0.0011
75% 0.0100 0.0107 0.0027
max 43.4150 279.1987 8,408.9315
TABLE IX. Mean of summary statistics for the Dow 30 conditioning on duration > 545µs
min. magnitude ($) max. magnitude ($) duration (s)
count 95,757.8000 95,757.8000 95,757.8000
mean 0.0427 0.2370 0.9557
std 0.3355 1.6130 48.2148
min 0.0200 0.0200 0.0005
25% 0.0200 0.0200 0.0007
50% 0.0200 0.0227 0.0011
75% 0.0307 0.0432 0.0036
max 43.4150 114.3480 7,186.8665
TABLE X. Mean of summary statistics for the Dow 30 conditioning on both duration > 545µs and magnitude >$0.01.
min. magnitude ($) max. magnitude ($) duration (s)
count 2,525,082.0448 2,525,082.0448 2,525,082.0448
mean 0.0135 0.0168 0.2530
std 0.2801 0.3996 9.3252
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.0000
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.0002
50% 0.0100 0.0101 0.0006
75% 0.0115 0.0136 0.0011
max 476.1177 522.6072 9,084.0401
TABLE XI. Mean of summary statistics for the SPexDow without conditioning on duration or magnitude
min. magnitude ($) max. magnitude ($) duration (s)
count 1,189,460.6682 1,189,460.6682 1,189,460.6682
mean 0.0134 0.0185 0.5558
std 0.4601 0.6076 13.0295
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.0005
25% 0.0100 0.0100 0.0008
50% 0.0102 0.0107 0.0011
75% 0.0117 0.0160 0.0082
max 471.7331 515.4222 9,084.0401
TABLE XII. Mean of summary statistics for the SPexDow conditioning on duration > 545µs
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min. magnitude ($) max. magnitude ($) duration (s)
count 114,770.0224 114,770.0224 114,770.0224
mean 0.0557 0.1249 1.5915
std 1.9177 2.5050 54.0650
min 0.0200 0.0200 0.0005
25% 0.0202 0.0209 0.0007
50% 0.0228 0.0346 0.0012
75% 0.0375 0.0625 0.0278
max 471.7331 506.9715 6,943.1063
TABLE XIII. Mean of summary statistics for the SPexDow conditioning on both duration > 545µs and magnitude >$0.01.
min. magnitude ($) max. magnitude ($) duration (s)
count 770,577.8246 770,577.8246 770,577.8246
mean 0.9734 1.1361 4.4132
std 34.0534 37.7472 50.0793
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.0000
25% 0.0116 0.0121 0.0002
50% 0.0139 0.0149 0.0010
75% 0.0225 0.0302 0.0138
max 2,238.1205 2,514.9617 8,796.9568
TABLE XIV. Mean of summary statistics for the RexSP without conditioning on either duration or magnitude.
min. magnitude ($) max. magnitude ($) duration (s)
count 287,399.7217 287,399.7217 287,399.7217
mean 1.2116 1.7162 12.7495
std 37.6277 46.3599 83.4650
min 0.0100 0.0100 0.0005
25% 0.0110 0.0118 0.0021
50% 0.0147 0.0188 0.0722
75% 0.0263 0.0408 0.9755
max 2,033.1633 2,302.4541 8,796.9568
TABLE XV. Mean of summary statistics for the RexSP conditioning on duration > 545µs
min. magnitude ($) max. magnitude ($) duration (s)
count 45,062.3366 45,062.3366 45,062.3366
mean 2.1734 3.0486 13.1546
std 53.2211 66.0958 112.1013
min 0.0200 0.0200 0.0005
25% 0.0239 0.0272 0.0039
50% 0.0338 0.0449 0.0536
75% 0.0611 0.0806 0.7988
max 2,033.9931 2,295.6782 7,139.0753
TABLE XVI. Mean of summary statistics for the RexSP conditioning on both duration > 545µs and magnitude >$0.01.
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $2,013,458,668.87
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $1,876,048,519.06
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $137,410,149.76
4 Trades 4,658,307,833
5 Diff. Trades 1,105,201,803
6 Traded Value $24,352,760,600,270.47
7 Diff. Traded Value $6,272,439,590,589.91
8 Percent Diff. Trades 23.73
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 25.76
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0855
TABLE XVII. Summary statistics of realized opportunity cost for all equities (all securities except for ETFs) during 2016.
©2018 The MITRE Corporation. All Rights Reserved.
Approved for Public Release; Distribution Unlimited Case 18-3296
18
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $160,213,922.95
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $122,081,126.40
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $38,132,796.55
4 Trades 392,101,579
5 Diff. Trades 87,432,231
6 Traded Value $3,858,963,034,003.48
7 Diff. Traded Value $900,535,924,961.72
8 Percent Diff. Trades 22.30
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 23.34
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0465
TABLE XVIII. Summary statistics of realized opportunity cost for Dow 30 securities during 2016.
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $1,064,715,340.25
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $964,098,388.26
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $100,616,951.99
4 Trades 2,564,892,761
5 Diff. Trades 623,146,506
6 Traded Value $18,429,250,470,003.83
7 Diff. Traded Value $4,567,166,871,544.24
8 Percent Diff. Trades 24.30
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 25.83
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0631
TABLE XIX. Summary statistics of realized opportunity cost for S&P 500 securities during 2016.
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $904,501,417.30
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $842,017,261.86
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $62,484,155.44
4 Trades 2,172,791,182
5 Diff. Trades 535,714,275
6 Traded Value $13,824,440,155,934.76
7 Diff. Traded Value $3,666,630,946,582.52
8 Percent Diff. Trades 24.66
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 26.52
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.0757
TABLE XX. Summary statistics of realized opportunity cost for SPexDow equities during 2016.
1 Realized Opportunity Cost $948,743,328.62
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $911,950,130.85
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $36,793,197.77
4 Trades 2,093,415,072
5 Diff. Trades 482,055,297
6 Traded Value $6,669,357,410,332.23
7 Diff. Traded Value $1,705,272,719,045.67
8 Percent Diff. Trades 23.03
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 25.57
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 1.1104
TABLE XXI. Summary statistics of realized opportunity cost for RexSP equities during 2016.
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Trades Traded Value ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share ($/shares)
count 720,991 720,991 720,991 720,991 720,991 720,991
mean 6,460.98 33,776,788.61 1,532.89 8,699,747.42 2,792.63 0.020880
std 13,249.67 109,021,779.70 3,036.98 25,738,960.57 17,611.14 0.087810
min 0 0 0 0 0 0
25% 599 1,118,022.02 101 199,882.83 237.6100 0.009510
50% 2,020 5,316,322.22 450 1,246,241.41 826.6000 0.011448
75% 6,478 24,797,793.44 1,600 6,525,124.17 2,578.75 0.018836
max 517,270 8,280,915,338.59 103,885 1,596,912,962.05 6,798,041.07 19.3381
TABLE XXII. Purse statistics for all stocks under study in 2016. The data used to construct this table is aggregated by date
and stock, resulting in 720,991 data points that correspond with the 731,556 combinations of 252 trading days in 2016 and
2903 stocks under study.
Trades Traded Value ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share ($/shares)
count 252 252 252 252 252 252
mean 10,178,145.88 70,172,234,880.71 2,472,803.60 18,123,678,061.68 4,225,060.87 0.014624
std 2,406,751.15 14,303,150,882.94 775,201.38 4,760,162,875.50 1,531,548.30 0.002019
min 3,862,591 29,960,724,653.08 709,540 5,941,906,620.96 1,281,537.70 0.011127
25% 8,716,552.50 60,764,387,798.11 2,034,844.50 15,251,685,767.67 3,371,948.52 0.013502
50% 9,684,039 67,776,548,100.32 2,310,806 17,479,288,594.91 3,918,496.70 0.014407
75% 11,120,226.50 75,672,607,052.02 2,783,838.50 20,074,235,595.26 4,654,693.39 0.015434
max 19,505,364 128,057,685,223.37 5,715,448 37,114,729,300.67 14,335,072.09 0.031484
TABLE XXIII. Aggregated purse statistics for S&P 500 constituents in 2016. The data used to construct this table is
aggregated by date, resulting in 252 data points that correspond with the 252 trading days in 2016.
Trades Traded Value ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share ($/shares)
count 252 252 252 252 252 252
mean 8,622,187.23 54,858,889,507.68 2,125,850.30 14,550,122,803.90 3,589,291.34 0.014818
std 1,960,102.37 10,686,728,768.81 632,025.23 3,571,347,460.11 1,119,395.15 0.002029
min 3,283,385 23,296,053,599.93 619,976 4,906,051,591.25 1,136,332.05 0.011271
25% 7,398,970.25 48,123,050,130.46 1,762,152.75 12,329,749,894.94 2,915,802.29 0.013729
50% 8,237,387.50 53,383,376,977.72 2,006,091.50 14,073,439,429.50 3,384,654.11 0.014579
75% 9,405,905.75 59,188,646,444.18 2,398,085.25 15,973,362,072.81 4,050,343.31 0.015660
max 15,909,358 99,048,039,796.82 4,642,419 27,685,776,913.57 9,097,891.31 0.032760
TABLE XXIV. Aggregated purse statistics for S&P 500 constituents that were not also Dow 30 constituents in 2016. The
data used to construct this table is aggregated by date, resulting in 252 data points that correspond with the 252 trading days
in 2016.
Trades Traded Value ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share ($/shares)
count 252 252 252 252 252 252
mean 1,555,958.65 15,313,345,373.03 346,953.30 3,573,555,257.78 635,769.54 0.011792
std 463,558.93 3,891,299,900.31 146,677.85 1,234,882,079.43 655,911.15 0.008071
min 579,206 6,664,671,053.15 89,564 1,035,855,029.71 145,205.65 0.008879
25% 1,278,813.25 12,915,031,172.08 262,209 2,804,569,367.64 417,485.73 0.009667
50% 1,429,062 14,431,597,662.01 309,158 3,274,390,601.60 514,856.64 0.010213
75% 1,715,351.25 16,829,521,684.38 387,772 3,993,470,514.97 666,268.27 0.011288
max 3,596,006 30,999,914,293.66 1,073,029 9,428,952,387.10 7,817,684.58 0.093108
TABLE XXV. Aggregated purse statistics for Dow 30 constituents in 2016. The data used to construct this table is aggregated
by date, resulting in 252 data points that correspond with the 252 trading days in 2016.
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Trades Traded Value ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share ($/shares)
count 252 252 252 252 252 252
mean 8,307,202.67 26,465,704,009.25 1,912,917.85 6,766,955,234.31 3,764,854.48 0.022109
std 1,370,512.88 3,786,979,882.64 473,884.96 1,299,054,438.46 1,048,372.83 0.002874
min 3,183,224 11,363,776,182.38 487,500 2,268,729,995.29 1,436,093.46 0.017744
25% 7,528,810.25 24,222,297,224.76 1,648,499.25 6,053,458,251.52 3,182,173.91 0.020092
50% 8,175,352.50 26,166,834,634.22 1,921,121.50 6,779,433,456.68 3,564,482.05 0.021393
75% 9,061,096.50 28,685,877,060.20 2,161,350.50 7,599,965,429.85 4,206,538.80 0.023737
max 13,408,508 41,337,807,991.92 3,537,890 10,627,257,029.61 10,083,342.57 0.047415
TABLE XXVI. Purse statistics for Russell 3000 constituents that were not S&P 500 constituents in 2016. The data used to
construct this table is aggregated by date, resulting in 252 data points that correspond with the 252 trading days in 2016.
Kurtosis Skew
AMEX Dow 57.59 -3.16
S&P 500 1265.74 -18.55
Russell 565.18 -20.06
ARCA Dow 7392.86 85.55
S&P 500 80740.09 258.93
Russell 27314.13 -118.14
BATS Dow 7334.11 85.06
S&P 500 37895.12 143.83
Russell 19742.38 -107.57
BATSY Dow 548.55 20.35
S&P 500 543.06 3.32
Russell 10735.67 -59.29
BX Dow 592.30 21.83
S&P 500 531.38 -5.23
Russell 15141.20 -84.69
CHX Dow 2409.74 48.36
S&P 500 4372.12 63.08
Russell 8728.17 84.94
EDGA Dow 641.74 22.78
S&P 500 322.96 -6.51
Russell 15832.73 -25.59
EDGX Dow 4136.75 57.38
S&P 500 8940.48 45.80
Russell 55652.52 -169.68
FINRA Dow 1777.76 35.53
S&P 500 10278.94 51.38
Russell 7875.99 17.50
IEX Dow 952.81 26.35
S&P 500 5009.89 45.36
Russell 5725.39 -45.48
INET Dow 244.31 11.99
S&P 500 5778.77 33.17
Russell 22048.67 -119.37
NSX Dow 71.78 4.32
S&P 500 1440.79 27.10
Russell 6001.35 62.79
NYSE Dow 2223.37 43.78
S&P 500 4250.17 30.79
Russell 7836.95 -54.89
PSX Dow 402.51 16.29
S&P 500 620.01 -16.69
Russell 12337.86 -74.91
TABLE XXVII. Kurtosis and skew for daily ROC by exchange. The distributions are remarkably heavy-tailed.
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1 Realized Opportunity Cost $38,458,070.79
2 SIP Opportunity Cost $37,970,135.30
3 Direct Opportunity Cost $487,935.49
4 Trades 86,725,286
5 Diff. Trades 19,612,214
6 Traded Value $3,678,242,397,422.43
7 Diff. Traded Value $804,917,872,051.93
8 Percent Diff. Trades 22.61
9 Percent Diff. Traded Value 21.88
10 Ratio of 9 / 8 0.9677
TABLE XXVIII. Summary statistics for realized opportunity cost observed in the ETFs under study. It is notable that, of
all market subsets we study, only this small subset has a ratio of the fraction of differing traded value to fraction of differing
trades with value below unity. On a per-trade basis, this means that there is on average less potential for realized opportunity
cost.
Trades Traded Value ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share ($/shares)
count 2,266 2,266 2,266 2,266 2,266 2,266
mean 38,272.41 1,623,231,419.87 8,654.99 355,215,300.99 16,971.79 0.016651
std 106,159.45 4,657,139,733.49 23,868.59 1,032,161,545.93 48,416.03 0.032486
min 0 0 0 0 0 0
25% 14 252,922.28 3 46,585.01 34.2000 0.008215
50% 676 14,513,478.58 175.5000 3,358,814.83 437.4200 0.009910
75% 12,101.50 282,371,508.76 4,123.25 93,738,485.93 6,009.93 0.013664
max 974,888 40,617,035,891.21 251,657 11,028,368,359.92 499,906.77 1.0200
TABLE XXIX. Aggregated purse statistics for the ETFs under study. The data used to construct this table is aggregated by
date and instrument, resulting in 2,266 data points that correspond with the 2,268 combinations of 252 trading days in 2016
and 9 ETFs under study.
Trades Traded Value ($) Diff. Trades Diff. Traded Value ($) ROC ($) ROC/Share ($/shares)
count 252 252 252 252 252 252
mean 344,147.96 14,596,199,989.77 77,826.25 3,194,118,539.89 152,611.39 0.189762
std 157,107.76 6,043,079,696.41 45,179.00 1,675,731,349.39 85,509.19 0.118446
min 113,860 5,018,912,183.01 14,610 703,559,994.91 30,989.52 0.054358
25% 237,021.25 10,471,387,904.01 47,237.50 2,052,459,478.17 94,488.20 0.106098
50% 308,705 13,005,695,875.47 66,509 2,780,132,908 131,084.42 0.169572
75% 394,822.25 16,641,275,220.96 94,108 3,799,483,257.76 186,174.78 0.256871
max 1,177,148 44,900,644,748.00 339,480 12,945,336,256.63 616,859.86 1.0963
TABLE XXX. Aggregated purse statistics for the ETFs under study. The data used to construct this table is aggregated by
date, resulting in 252 data points that correspond with the 252 trading days in 2016.
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Appendix B: Figures
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FIG. 6. ROC by ticker ($) for the top 30 (left panel) and bottom 30 (right panel) of all securities under study, ranked by
ROC. Constituents of the Dow 30 are shown in blue, constituents of the S&P 500 (excluding the Dow 30) are shown in green,
constituents of the Russell 3000 (excluding the S&P 500) are shown in red, and ETFs are shown in black.
FIG. 7. ROC by ticker ($) for the top 30 (left panel) and bottom 30 (right panel) of S&P 500 securities, ranked by ROC.
Constituents of the Dow 30 are shown in blue, while those belonging to the S&P 500 (excluding the Dow 30) are shown in
green.
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FIG. 8. ROC per share ($ / share) by ticker for the top 30 (left panel) and bottom 30 (right panel) of all securities under
study, ranked by ROC. Constituents of the Dow 30 are shown in blue, constituents of the S&P 500 (excluding the Dow 30) are
shown in green, and constituents of the Russell 3000 (excluding the S&P 500) are shown in red.
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FIG. 9. Total ROC per day ($ / day) by exchange over Dow 30 equities. The vertical axis is transformed by x 7→ log10(x+ 1).
The label INET refers to the NASDAQ exchange proper, while FINRA refers to the aggregation of all ATSs.
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FIG. 10. Total ROC per day ($ / day) by exchange over S&P 500 equities. The vertical axis is transformed by x 7→ log10(x+1).
The label INET refers to the NASDAQ exchange proper, while FINRA refers to the aggregation of all ATSs.
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FIG. 11. Total ROC per day ($ / day) by exchange over Russell 3000 equities. The vertical axis is transformed by
x 7→ log10(x + 1). The label INET refers to the NASDAQ exchange proper, while FINRA refers to the aggregation of all
ATSs.
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FIG. 12. ROC per share per day ($ / day) by exchange over Dow 30 equities. The label INET refers to the NASDAQ exchange
proper, while FINRA refers to the aggregation of all ATSs.
FIG. 13. ROC per share per day ($ / day) by exchange over S&P 500 equities. The label INET refers to the NASDAQ
exchange proper, while FINRA refers to the aggregation of all ATSs.
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FIG. 14. ROC per share per day ($ / day) by exchange over Russell 3000 equities. The label INET refers to the NASDAQ
exchange proper, while FINRA refers to the aggregation of all ATSs.
FIG. 15. Equities are plotted in rank-order of ROC per traded value; the 0-th equity has highest ROC per traded value. The
first over-100 top equities are in the RexSP, which is unsurprising due to their combination of generally lower liquidity and
lower share prices. Blue markers are associated with constituents of the Dow 30, green markers with constituents of the S&P
500 (excluding the Dow 30), red markers with constituents of the Russell 3000 (excluding the S&P 500), and black markers
with ETFs.
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FIG. 16. Empirical quantile-quantile (QQ) plot for the normalized ROC per share processes. It is clear that the distribution
of the SPexDow and RexSP processes are similar, and both are markedly different from the Dow process (blue line).
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FIG. 17. Normalized ROC per share processes. There is one observation per day for a total of 252 observations in the process.
These processes are anti-autocorrelated (Dow DFA exponent α = 0.434, SPexDow DFA exponent α = 0.226, RexSP DFA
exponent α = 0.301) and exhibit rare large values. The lower panel provides evidence for nonlinear cross-correlation between
the SPexDow and RexSP ROC per share processes.
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FIG. 18. Distributions of latency arbitrage duration. Columns are associated with an index (left to right: Dow 30, S&P
500 excluding the Dow 30, Russell 3000 excluding the S&P 500) and rows are associated with conditioning strategies (top to
bottom: no conditioning, magnitude greater than $0.01).
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FIG. 19. Distributions of dislocation segment start time. Columns are associated with an index (left to right: Dow 30, S&P
500 excluding the Dow 30, Russell 3000 excluding the S&P 500) and rows are associated with conditioning strategies (top to
bottom: no conditioning, duration greater than 545 µs, duration greater than 545 µs and magnitude greater than $0.01).
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Appendix C: Statistics
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Ordered pair Lags
Dow → RexSP 2,..., 4, 13,...,15,20, 22,...,37
Dow → SPexDow
RexSP → Dow 1, 3, 35, 36
RexSP → SPexDow
SPexDow → Dow 1, ..., 10, 15,...,24, 26, 30,...,34
SPexDow → RexSP 1, ..., 4
TABLE XXXI. Granger causality results for pairwise combinations of mutually-exclusive subsets of the equities under study.
In order to qualify as a significant result, all four Granger causality tests (parameter F -test, sum of squared residuals F -test,
likelihood-ratio test, χ2-test) had to indicate causality at a p = 0.05/Nlags level. The maximum number of lags was chosen to
be Nlags = 40.
Dep. Variable: log10 ROC R-squared: 0.908
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.908
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 7179.
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Time: 12:43:35 Log-Likelihood: 551.07
No. Observations: 2884 AIC: -1094.
Df Residuals: 2880 BIC: -1070.
Df Model: 3
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept 1.0052 0.091 11.050 0.000 0.827 1.183
l MarketCap 0.1183 0.011 10.675 0.000 0.097 0.140
l total trades -0.2203 0.043 -5.127 0.000 -0.304 -0.136
l differing trades 0.9023 0.040 22.286 0.000 0.823 0.982
Omnibus: 1630.431 Durbin-Watson: 2.007
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 23812.396
Skew: 2.375 Prob(JB): 0.00
Kurtosis: 16.252 Cond. No. 259.
TABLE XXXII. Ordinary least squares regression predicting realized opportunity cost using market capitalization, differing
trades, and total trades.
Dep. Variable: log10 ROC R-squared: 0.925
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.925
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 5970.
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Time: 12:43:35 Log-Likelihood: 846.73
No. Observations: 2884 AIC: -1679.
Df Residuals: 2877 BIC: -1638.
Df Model: 6
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept 7.8666 0.802 9.811 0.000 6.295 9.438
l MarketCap -0.0738 0.149 -0.496 0.620 -0.365 0.218
l total trades -4.1661 0.432 -9.638 0.000 -5.013 -3.319
l differing trades 3.0804 0.338 9.103 0.000 2.417 3.744
np.power(l MarketCap, 2) 0.0067 0.008 0.837 0.402 -0.009 0.022
np.power(l total trades, 2) 0.3385 0.038 8.936 0.000 0.264 0.413
np.power(l differing trades, 2) -0.2042 0.034 -6.002 0.000 -0.271 -0.138
Omnibus: 1952.210 Durbin-Watson: 1.988
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 50808.169
Skew: 2.831 Prob(JB): 0.00
Kurtosis: 22.768 Cond. No. 1.70e+04
TABLE XXXIII. Ordinary least squares regression predicting realized opportunity cost using market capitalization, differing
trades, and total trades. Quadratic terms are included.
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Dep. Variable: log10 ROC R-squared: 0.600
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.600
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 4280.
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Time: 12:43:30 Log-Likelihood: -1574.9
No. Observations: 2884 AIC: 3154.
Df Residuals: 2882 BIC: 3166.
Df Model: 1
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept -1.4415 0.108 -13.398 0.000 -1.652 -1.231
l MarketCap 0.7368 0.011 65.422 0.000 0.715 0.759
Omnibus: 52.492 Durbin-Watson: 1.933
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 76.592
Skew: 0.199 Prob(JB): 2.34e-17
Kurtosis: 3.692 Cond. No. 126.
TABLE XXXIV. Ordinary least squares regression predicting realized opportunity cost using only market capitalization.
Dep. Variable: log10 ROC R-squared: 0.603
Model: OLS Adj. R-squared: 0.603
Method: Least Squares F-statistic: 2904.
Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 Prob (F-statistic): 0.00
Time: 12:43:30 Log-Likelihood: -1564.7
No. Observations: 2884 AIC: 3135.
Df Residuals: 2881 BIC: 3153.
Df Model: 2
coef std err z P>|z| [0.025 0.975]
Intercept -6.2441 1.286 -4.857 0.000 -8.764 -3.724
l MarketCap 1.7575 0.266 6.598 0.000 1.235 2.280
np.power(l MarketCap, 2) -0.0539 0.014 -3.927 0.000 -0.081 -0.027
Omnibus: 67.584 Durbin-Watson: 1.935
Prob(Omnibus): 0.000 Jarque-Bera (JB): 100.782
Skew: 0.242 Prob(JB): 1.30e-22
Kurtosis: 3.777 Cond. No. 1.24e+04
TABLE XXXV. Ordinary least squares regression predicting realized opportunity cost using only market capitalization.
Quadratic terms are included.
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